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Abstract
Using forecasts of the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso, we analyze the shape of
the loss function of exchange-rate forecasters and the rationality of their forecasts.
We ﬁnd a substantial degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity with respect to the shape
of the loss function. While some forecasters seem to forecasts under an asymmetric
loss function, symmetry of the loss function cannot be rejected for other forecasters.
An asymmetric loss function does not necessarily make survey data of exchange-rate
forecasts look rational, and the loss function seems to depend not only on the forecast
error.
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Since Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) reported a lack of explanatory power of exchange rate mod-
els, economic studies frequently show that it is notoriously diﬃcult to forecast exchange
rate ﬂuctuations by means of structural economic models. This is especially true with
regard to exchange rates of emerging market countries. A characteristic features of ex-
change rates of emerging market countries is that they witness large ﬂuctuations and often
eruptive jumps. Large ﬂuctuations and eruptive jumps of exchange rates constitute a ma-
jor challenge to policymakers, international investors, and international ﬁrms in emerging
countries. Given the poor forecasting performance of structural economic models, survey
data of exchange rate forecasts of professional economists have widely been studied as an
alternative source of information for forecasting exchange rates. Many researchers, how-
ever, have reported that survey data of exchange rate forecasts violate traditional criteria
of forecast rationality (for a survey, see MacDonald 2000). Violation of traditional criteria
of forecast rationality, in turn, gives rise to doubts as to the usefulness of survey data for
forecasting exchange rates.
Traditional criteria of forecast rationality are based on the assumption that forecasters have
a symmetric (quadratic) loss function. Patton and Timmermann (2007) argue that invoking
the assumption of a symmetric loss function could be problematic for traditional rationality
tests if, in fact, forecasters have an asymmetric loss function. It has been well-known for
quite a while that there are good reasons to argue that loss functions are not symmetric
(Granger 1969; Granger and Newbold 1986; Zellner 1986; Christoﬀersen and Diebold 1997,
among others). Recent research provides ample evidence indicating that deviations from
1a symmetric loss function may be quite common (Elliott et al. 2005; Christodoulakis
and Mamatzakis 2008a; Döpke et al. 2010; among others). Research on asymmetric loss
functions estimated on survey data of exchange rate forecasts, however, has started only
recently. Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2008b) study the exchange rates of the G10
countries. While they report evidence in favor of an asymmetric loss function, they derive
their ﬁnding using forward exchange rates to measure exchange rate expectations. Another
recent study by Pierdzioch et al. (2012), in contrast, uses survey data of exchange rate
forecasts that contain information on the yen/dollar exchange rate forecasts of individual
forecasters. Research on asymmetric loss functions that analyzes the properties of survey
data of forecasts of emerging market countries at the microeconomic level of individual
forecasters is, to the best of our knowledge, not available. The research by Baghestani and
Marchon (2012) is an exception insofar as they analyze an asymmetric loss function using
forecasts of the Brazilian real, an important emerging market exchange rate. They study
forecasts collected from a survey conducted by the Brazilian Central Bank. They do not
study, however, exchange rate forecasts at the level of individual forecasters. Rather, their
study is restricted to the mean (that is, the consensus) forecast and hence studies the time
series characteristics of the survey. Their study does not take the cross-sectional dimension
and the cross-sectional heterogeneity of forecasts at the microeconomic level into account.
Our research is a ﬁrst step to close this gap in the literature. Following Christodoulakis
and Mamatzakis (2008b), Baghestani and Marchon (2012), and Pierdzioch et al. (2012),
we shape our empirical analysis in terms of an approach recently developed by Elliott et
al. (2005) to recover the shape of exchange rate forecasters’ loss function. This approach is
easy to implement, it informs about the type of a potential asymmetry in forecasters’ loss
2function, and it allows the rationality of forecasts under an asymmetric loss function to be
tested. We apply the approach advanced by Elliott et al. (2005) to study survey data of
forecasts of the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar for the time
period 1995 – 2009. Our empirical results show a substantial degree of heterogeneity across
exchange rate forecasters’ with respect to the shape of forecasters’ loss function. While a
symmetric loss function seems to ﬁt the forecasts of some forecasters, an asymmetric loss
function seems to be consistent with forecasts of other forecasters. In line with results
reported by Pierdzioch et al. (2012), our empirical results further show that assuming an
asymmetric loss function does not necessarily make survey data of exchange rate forecasts
look rational. While, in some cases, an asymmetric loss function remedies apparent devi-
ations from rationality that obtain under a symmetric loss function, this is not a general
feature of the data. Importantly, whether an asymmetric loss function makes forecasts
look rational in many cases depends on the shape of the assumed loss function. In other
words, a single loss function does not ﬁt equally well the forecasts of all forecasters.
Given that the assumed parametrization seems to aﬀect the results of the rationality test
advanced by Elliott et al. (2005), we proceed by analyzing the survey data of exchange
rate forecasts using an alternative test that has recently been suggested by Patton and
Timmermann (2007). Their test is more general than the test developed by Elliott et al.
(2005) because it does not rest on a speciﬁc parametrization of the loss function. The test
only assumes under the null hypothesis of forecast rationality that the loss function either
only depends on the forecast error or is homogeneous in the forecast error. The test yields
sound rejections of the null hypothesis for the majority of forecasters. The test also yields
the result that if the exchange rate forecast exceeds (falls short of) the current exchange
3rate, then the probability that the exchange rate forecast also exceeds (falls short of) the
future exchange rate increases. We argue that this result can be interpreted in terms of
recent research on forecaster (anti-) herding in foreign exchange markets (Pierdzioch and
Stadtmann 2010).
We organize the reminder of this paper as follows. In Section ??, we brieﬂy outline the
approach developed by Elliott et al. (2005) and the rationality test suggested by Patton
and Timmermann (2007). In Section ??, we describe our data and our empirical results.
In Section ??, we oﬀer some concluding remarks.
2 The Empirical Model: Estimation and Testing
In Section ??, we describe how we estimated the shape of the loss function. In Section
??, we describe how we tested for forecast rationality under the assumption of a speciﬁc
parametrization of the loss function and under the assumption of an unknown loss function.
2.1 Estimation
The approach developed by Elliott et al. (2005) rests on the assumption that the loss
function, L, of an exchange rate forecaster can be described in terms of the following
general functional form:
L = [ + (1   2)I(st+1   ft+1 < 0)]jst+1   fs+tj
p; (1)
4where st+1 denotes the realization of the exchange rate, ft+1, denotes the forecast formed
in period t of the realization of the exchange rate in period t + 1, I denotes the indicator
function, p = 1 for a lin-lin loss function and p = 2 for a quad-quad loss function, and
 2 (0;1) governs the degree of asymmetry of the loss function. In the case of  = 0:5, the
loss function is symmetric. For  = 0:5 and p = 2, the loss a forecaster incurs increases
in the squared forecast error. For  = 0:5 and p = 1, the loss increases in the absolute
forecast error. A value of  > 0:5 represents the case of forecasters’ tendency to issue
optimistic forecasts (to overpredict relative to the symmetric case). The opposite case –
 < 0:5 stands for the case of pessimistic forecasts.
Elliott et al. (2005) show that, for a given parameter p, which deﬁnes the general functional


























t= vtjst+1   ft+1jp 1
i ;
(2)




t(I(st+1   ft+1 < 0)   ^ )2jst+1   ft+1j2p 2 denotes a weighting
matrix, vt denotes a vector of instruments, T denotes the number of forecasts available,
starting at  + 1. Elliott et al. (2005) deﬁne conditions for optimality of forecasts, which,
in turn, deliver the moment conditions for an IV estimation procedure (more speciﬁcally: a
GMM estimation). The optimality conditions refer to the fact, that all outside information
(the IV vector) are included in the forecast and therefore orthogonal to the forecast error.
Because the resulting weighting matrix of the GMM estimator depends on ^ , estimation
is done iteratively. Testing whether ^  diﬀers from 0 is done by using the following z-test
5p
T(^  0) ! N(0;(^ h0 ^ S 1^ h) 1), where ^ h = 1
T
PT+ 1
t= vtjst+1  ft+1jp 1. Testing whether
^  diﬀers from 0 is done by using the following z-test
p
T(^    0) ! N(0;(^ h0 ^ S 1^ h) 1),
where ^ h = 1
T
PT+ 1
t= vtjst+1   ft+1jp 1.
We considered as instruments a constant (Model 1), and a constant and lagged exchange
rate (Model 2). Because the survey data that we shall describe in Section ?? below contains
forecasts for an unbalanced panel of forecasters, we did not follow Elliott et al. (2005) in
using lagged published forecasts as another instrument.
2.2 Testing
For the speciﬁc parametrization of the loss function outlined in Section ??, Elliott et al.
(2005) further prove that a test for rationality of exchange rate forecasts, given a loss















t= vt[I(st+1   ft+1 < 0)   ^ ]jst+1   ft+1jp 1 and d denotes the number
of instruments. This is similar to the usual test of over-identifying restrictions in the
GMM framework. In the case of a symmetric loss function, the rationality test is given by
J(0:5)  2
d. The statistic J(0:5) answers the question of whether forecasters under the
maintained assumption of a quadratic (symmetric) loss function form rational exchange
rate forecasts. The statistic J(^ ), answers the question of whether forecasters form rational
forecasts, given an asymmetric loss function (lin-lin or quad-quad). A comparison of J(^ )
6with J(0:5) shows whether an asymmetric loss function helps to remedy a potential failure
of rationality of forecasts observed under a symmetric loss function.
Patton and Timmermann (2007, Proposition 3) show that if the loss only depends on the
forecast error (and the exchange rate has dynamics only in the conditional mean) or the loss
function is homogenous in the forecast error (and the exchange rate has dynamics in the
conditional mean and variance), a simple quantile test can be used to analyze the rationality
of exchange rate forecasts. The quantile test stipulates that, under the null hypothesis of
forecast rationality, it should not be possible to forecast the sign of the forecast error using
data that are in the information set of forecasters at the time a forecast is made.
In order to implement the quantile test, we deﬁne It+1 = 1 if st+1  ft+1 < 0, and It+1 = 0
otherwise. As for the information set of forecasters at the time a forecast is made, we
consider the wedge between the current exchange rate and the forecast, st   ft+1, that is,
the forecast of the relative change in the exchange rate. The resulting quantile test can be
implemented by estimating the following equation:
It+1 = 0 + 1(st   ft+1) + t+1; (4)
where 0 and 1 are coeﬃcients to be estimated, and t+1 is a disturbance term. Estimation
can be done by ordinary least squares, or by using a qualitative response model.1 If 1 < 0,
1Because of the limited number of observations per forecaster, we shall present estimation results for
a model estimated by means of the ordinary least squares technique. Results for a qualitative response
model, however, are similar to those we shall present in the vast majority of cases and are available upon
request. When estimation is done using ordinary least squares, Equation (??) is similar to standard tests
of market timing. Market timing tests are widely studied in the empirical ﬁnance literature to explore
7then the model implies that the future exchange rate tends to fall short of the forecast if
the current exchange rate falls short (exceeds) of the forecast, st < ft+1. Conversely, if
1 > 0, the future exchange rate tends to fall short of the forecast if the current exchange
rate exceeds (falls short) the forecast, st < ft+1.
3 Empirical Analysis
In order to recover a potential asymmetry in forecasters’ loss function, we use survey
data on one-month-ahead and three-months-ahead forecasts of the Brazilian real and the
Mexican peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. The survey data are from Consensus Forecasts
Inc. The survey data contain information on individual exchange rate forecasts issued
by forecasters who work for institutions such as investment banks, large international
corporations, economic research institutes, and at universities. Because not all forecasters
participated in all surveys, the survey data are available in the form of an unbalanced
panel. For our empirical analysis, we only consider the forecasts of those forecasters who
participated at least 15 times in the survey. In total, we use 1,120 forecasts for our empirical
analysis, with approximately half of the forecasters being one-month-ahead forecasts and
the other half three-months-ahead forecasts. The survey data are irregularly spaced in time
and are conducted on average on a quarterly frequency for the period 1995/1 2009/12.
– Please insert Figure ?? about here. –
whether forecasts of excess returns predict the sign of future actual returns. In the context of our survey
data of exchange rate forecasts, the test can be interpreted as a “test of forecast-error timing”.
8Figure ?? shows the exchange rate (solid line) and the cross-sectional maximum and min-
imum of exchange rate forecasts (circles and triangles). Both exchange rates substan-
tially ﬂuctuated over time, experiencing occasional sudden jumps and trend reversals. The
cross-sectional maximum and minimum of exchange rate forecasts further recovers, at the
microeconomic level of individual forecasters, the kind of cross-forecaster heterogeneity
reported in earlier literature (MacDonald and Marsh 1996, Benassy-Quere et al. 2003).
– Please insert Table ?? about here. –
Under a symmetric loss functions, rational forecasts should be unbiased, that is, forecast
errors should exhibit no systematic component, hovering around zero. As a test for bias, we
use the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test with the null hypothesis that the median
of the forecast errors is equal to zero. According to Campbell and Ghysels (1995), such a
non-parametric test is preferable to parametric tests for small samples.2 The results (Table
??) yield evidence of a systematic component in the forecast errors for some forecasters,
but not for all forecasters. For example, the forecasts delivered by Forecaster No. 11 seem
to be biased both in the case of one-month-ahead and three-months-ahead forecasts. For
Forecaster No. 4, in turn, forecasts seem to be biased on the three-months, but not at
the one-month forecast horizon. In total, approximately one-third of all forecasters deliver
forecasts that result in a signiﬁcant test outcome. It is, thus, interesting to explore in more
detail whether asymmetries in forecasters’ loss functions account for their biased forecasts.
2See also Dufor (1981) and Campbell and Ghysels (1995) for further details. A non-parametric test has
the advantage of avoiding restrictive assumptions on well-behaved residuals as in the case of most of the
regression-based tests.
9Tables ?? (lin-lin) and ?? (quad-quad) summarize the estimated asymmetry parameter,
^ , the corresponding standard error, and the results of the z-test for one-month-ahead
forecasts. Tables ?? and ?? show the results for three-months-ahead forecasts. The results
of the z-test recover statistically signiﬁcant deviations from a symmetric loss function for
some (but not all) forecasters, where ^  > 0:5 for some forecasters, and ^  < 0:5 for others.
An estimated asymmetry parameter of ^  > 0:5 implies that exchange rate forecasters
incur a higher loss when they underestimate the future exchange rate than when they
overestimate the future exchange rate. An estimated asymmetry parameter of ^  < 0:5, in
contrast, implies that overestimations are more costly than underestimations. The cross-
sectional heterogeneity with respect to the estimated asymmetry parameter, ^ , holds under
a lin-lin and under a quad-quad loss function.
– Please include Tables ??   ?? about here. –
Table ??   ?? summarize the results of the J test of an asymmetric loss function and
forecast rationality. As for one-month-ahead forecasts, the test results indicate, for ex-
ample, deviations from rationality under an asymmetric loss function for Forecasters No.
6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, and 22 on a ten percent signiﬁcance level (lin-lin). Interestingly, for
Forecasters No. 5, 11, 13, 14, and 17 forecast rationality can be rejected for symmetric loss
but not for asymmetric loss (lin-lin). Table ?? reports that for the three-months ahead
forecasts forecast rationality under an asymmetric lin-lin loss function can only be rejected
for four forecasters. For a quad-quad loss function, we observe that forecast rationality
can be rejected for 15 forecasters at the one-month horizon and for eight forecasters at a
10three-month-horizon. Hence, the rejection of forecast rationality depends on the assumed
shape of the loss function. The general impression that emerges, thus, is that, in many
cases, whether an asymmetry in the shape of the loss function makes forecasts of exchange
rate look rational depends on the speciﬁc functional form of the assumed loss function.
– Please include Tables ??   ?? about here. –
We, therefore, study the quantile test for forecast rationality analyzed by Patton and
Timmermann (2007), which does not depend on any speciﬁc functional form of the loss
function. For many forecasters, test results (Tables ??   ??) reject the rationality of
forecasts. Alternatively, the dynamics of exchange rates may violate the assumptions of
the test under the null hypothesis. If so, the loss function may not only depend on the
forecast error if exchange rates have dynamics only in the conditional mean, or the loss
function is not homogenous in the forecast error if the exchange rate has dynamics in the
conditional mean and variance.
– Please include Tables ??   ?? about here. –
4 Concluding Remarks
Our empirical results recover a substantial degree of heterogeneity across forecasters of the
Brazilian real and the Mexican peso with respect to the shape of their loss function and
11the rationality of their forecasts. We have shown that neither an asymmetric loss function
nor congruence of forecasts with the criterion of forecast rationality are general features
of forecasts. While some forecasters’ loss function seems to be quadratic, other forecasters
seem to have an asymmetric loss function. Accounting for an asymmetric loss function
does not necessarily imply that the hypothesis of rational forecasts cannot be rejected.
Of course, violation of forecast rationality need not reﬂect that forecasters indeed form
irrational forecasts. It may simply be the case that the process of forecasting exchange
rates is more complex than implied by the lin-lin or quad-quad loss functions that we have
considered in our empirical analysis. For example, strategic interactions among forecasters
may lead them to publish forecasts that intentionally deviate from the forecasts of others.
In this respect, it is instructive to interpret the results of the quantile test of forecast
rationality in terms of a test of forecaster (anti-)herding recently developed by Bernhardt
et al. (2006). In order to sketch the logic of the test developed by Bernhardt et al.
(2006), it is useful to consider a forecaster who forms an “eﬃcient” (that is, rational)
private forecast of the future exchange rate. In terms of Equation (??), a rational private
forecast implies that the forecast of the rate of change in the exchange rate should have
no explanatory power with respect to the ex-post forecast error, such that we should have
1 = 0. Conversely, a parameter 1 6= 0 indicates forecast ineﬃciency.
Such forecast ineﬃciency arises if the eventually published forecast diﬀers from the rational
private forecast. One reason for a potential wedge between the private forecast and the
published forecast is that the latter is inﬂuenced by public information as embedded in,
for example, the current exchange rate. In the case of forecaster herding, a forecaster
12publishes a forecast that “mimics” public information, implying that the published forecast
is tilted towards the current exchange rate. If the private forecast exceeds the current
exchange rate, st > ft+1, the probability increases that the published forecast turns out
to be smaller ex post than the actual future exchange rate, st+1   ft+1 < 0, requiring
1 > 0. In contrast, if a forecaster anti-herds, the published forecast scatters farther away
from the current exchange rate, and the probability that the actual future exchange rate
undershoots the forecast, st+1 ft+1 < 0, will increase, requiring 1 < 0, as in our empirical
analysis.
In terms of a suggested interpretation, our results thus provide some evidence that fore-
casters tend to anti-herd. Forecaster anti-herding in foreign exchange markets has also
been reported by Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2010). Forecaster-anti-herding may reﬂect
that forecasters do not only take into account the accuracy of their forecasts, but that they
also try to diﬀerentiate their forecasts from the forecasts of others. Such forecast diﬀerenti-
ation is likely to result in “extreme” forecasts, which may be a source of the cross-sectional
heterogeneity of forecasts that we have observed in our empirical analysis. Attempts to
diﬀerentiate forecasts, in turn, may reﬂect that forecasters are paid according to their rel-
ative forecasting success, as in the model suggested by Laster et al. (1999). If so, forecast
accuracy is not the only argument in forecasters’ loss function, implying that the kind of
asymmetric loss functions underlying the estimation approach developed by Elliott et al.
(2005) may not suﬃce to model how forecasters form their forecasts. We leave it to future
research to explore in detail the links between forecaster anti-herding and empirical tests
of asymmetries in forecasters’ loss functions.
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16Table 1: Wilcoxon rank sum test
Horizon One-Month-Ahead Three-Months-Ahead
No. Country Obs. Test p Obs. Test p
1 Brazil 23 114 0.4654 23 115 0.5009
2 Brazil 18 93 0.7660 21 120 0.8917
3 Brazil 22 172 0.1465 22 150 0.4552
4 Brazil 25 152 0.7915 25 96 0.0755
5 Brazil 20 31 0.0042 20 58 0.0826
6 Brazil 19 74 0.4180 19 61 0.1819
7 Brazil 22 144 0.5879 23 125 0.7090
8 Brazil 28 162 0.3505 28 148 0.2146
9 Brazil 27 101 0.0340 27 94 0.0214
10 Brazil 22 173 0.1375 24 162 0.7469
11 Brazil 17 32 0.0348 17 34 0.0448
12 Mexico 28 110 0.0337 28 118 0.0534
13 Mexico 21 64 0.0760 28 116 0.0477
14 Mexico 25 127 0.3525 25 139 0.5424
15 Mexico 28 160 0.3386 28 161 0.3502
16 Mexico 16 9 0.0010 16 58 0.6322
17 Mexico 25 87 0.0422 25 112 0.1817
18 Mexico 18 59 0.2645 18 76 0.7019
19 Mexico 16 51 0.4037 16 78 0.6322
20 Mexico 26 136 0.3276 26 120 0.1651
21 Mexico 21 75 0.1644 21 69 0.1111
22 Mexico 31 165 0.1066 31 156 0.0727
23 Mexico 31 133 0.0233 31 138 0.0305
24 Mexico 24 125 0.4908 25 130 0.3957
17Table 2: Asymmetry parameter, one-month-ahead forecasts, lin-lin loss function
No. Country Obs. ^ Model1 se z-test ^ Model2 se z-test
1 Brazil 23 0.6522 0.0993 1.5323 0.6534 0.0992 1.5458
2 Brazil 18 0.5000 0.1179 0.0000 0.5000 0.1179 0.0000
3 Brazil 22 0.5000 0.1066 0.0000 0.5000 0.1066 0.0000
4 Brazil 25 0.5600 0.0993 0.6044 0.5600 0.0993 0.6044
5 Brazil 20 0.8000 0.0894 3.3541 0.8340 0.0832 4.0148
6 Brazil 19 0.6842 0.1066 1.7274 0.8193 0.0883 3.6169
7 Brazil 22 0.5909 0.1048 0.8673 0.6479 0.1018 1.4524
8 Brazil 28 0.5714 0.0935 0.7638 0.5907 0.0929 0.9764
9 Brazil 27 0.7037 0.0879 2.3180 0.7039 0.0879 2.3210
10 Brazil 22 0.4091 0.1048 -0.8673 0.3870 0.1038 -1.0883
11 Brazil 17 0.8235 0.0925 3.4991 0.8909 0.0756 5.1690
12 Mexico 28 0.7857 0.0775 3.6845 0.9007 0.0565 7.0907
13 Mexico 21 0.7619 0.0929 2.8179 0.7759 0.0910 3.0317
14 Mexico 25 0.7200 0.0898 2.4499 0.7258 0.0892 2.5303
15 Mexico 28 0.6429 0.0906 1.5776 0.7118 0.0856 2.4747
16 Mexico 16 0.8125 0.0976 3.2026 0.9220 0.0670 6.2937
17 Mexico 25 0.7200 0.0898 2.4499 0.7237 0.0894 2.5009
18 Mexico 18 0.6111 0.1149 0.9670 0.8382 0.0868 3.8968
19 Mexico 16 0.6875 0.1159 1.6181 0.7147 0.1129 1.9019
20 Mexico 26 0.6154 0.0954 1.2093 0.6266 0.0949 1.3351
21 Mexico 21 0.6667 0.1029 1.6202 0.6710 0.1025 1.6679
22 Mexico 31 0.6774 0.0840 2.1132 0.7144 0.0811 2.6426
23 Mexico 31 0.6774 0.0840 2.1132 0.6800 0.0838 2.1487
24 Mexico 24 0.6667 0.0962 1.7321 0.6800 0.0952 1.8908
Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis that ^  = 0:5. The instruments used are the following: a
constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2).
18Table 3: Asymmetry parameter, three-months-ahead forecasts, lin-lin loss function
No. Country Obs. ^ Model1 se z-test ^ Model2 se z-test
1 Brazil 23 0.6522 0.0993 1.5323 0.6573 0.0990 1.5898
2 Brazil 21 0.4762 0.1090 -0.2185 0.4653 0.1088 -0.3192
3 Brazil 22 0.5455 0.1062 0.4282 0.5482 0.1061 0.4541
4 Brazil 25 0.6400 0.0960 1.4583 0.6402 0.0960 1.4604
5 Brazil 20 0.7500 0.0968 2.5820 0.8016 0.0892 3.3822
6 Brazil 19 0.7368 0.1010 2.3444 0.8843 0.0734 5.2384
7 Brazil 23 0.6957 0.0959 2.0392 0.8278 0.0787 4.1627
8 Brazil 28 0.7143 0.0854 2.5100 0.7218 0.0847 2.6191
9 Brazil 27 0.7778 0.0800 3.4718 0.8585 0.0671 5.3457
10 Brazil 24 0.4583 0.1017 -0.4097 0.4565 0.1017 -0.4278
11 Brazil 17 0.7647 0.1029 2.5730 0.7648 0.1029 2.5736
12 Mexico 28 0.6786 0.0883 2.0233 0.6994 0.0867 2.3008
13 Mexico 28 0.6429 0.0906 1.5776 0.6520 0.0900 1.6891
14 Mexico 25 0.6000 0.0980 1.0206 0.6025 0.0979 1.0474
15 Mexico 28 0.5714 0.0935 0.7638 0.5716 0.0935 0.7660
16 Mexico 16 0.4375 0.1240 -0.5040 0.4136 0.1231 -0.7016
17 Mexico 25 0.5600 0.0993 0.6044 0.5620 0.0992 0.6246
18 Mexico 18 0.5000 0.1179 0.0000 0.5000 0.1179 0.0000
19 Mexico 16 0.3750 0.1210 -1.0328 0.3655 0.1204 -1.1173
20 Mexico 26 0.7308 0.0870 2.6528 0.7312 0.0869 2.6592
21 Mexico 21 0.6190 0.1060 1.1234 0.6276 0.1055 1.2092
22 Mexico 31 0.7097 0.0815 2.5719 0.7427 0.0785 3.0906
23 Mexico 31 0.6774 0.0840 2.1132 0.7077 0.0817 2.5427
24 Mexico 25 0.5200 0.0999 0.2002 0.5200 0.0999 0.2002
Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis that ^  = 0:5. The instruments used are the following: a
constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2).
19Table 4: Asymmetry parameter, one-month-ahead forecasts, quad-quad loss function
No. Country Obs. ^ Model1 se z-test ^ Model2 se z-test
1 Brazil 23 0.5570 0.1399 0.4075 0.7479 0.1193 2.0785
2 Brazil 18 0.4277 0.1511 -0.4783 0.3619 0.1464 -0.9432
3 Brazil 22 0.1901 0.1026 -3.0211 0.1833 0.0897 -3.5301
4 Brazil 25 0.4610 0.1281 -0.3042 0.4511 0.1229 -0.3980
5 Brazil 20 0.8106 0.1512 2.0543 0.9811 0.0149 32.372
6 Brazil 19 0.5785 0.1440 0.5452 0.8341 0.0948 3.5241
7 Brazil 22 0.3411 0.1344 -1.1824 0.3555 0.1323 -1.0923
8 Brazil 28 0.6095 0.1303 0.8403 0.7902 0.1062 2.7337
9 Brazil 27 0.7994 0.0921 3.2515 0.9465 0.0401 11.128
10 Brazil 22 0.3511 0.1665 -0.8946 0.1647 0.0916 -3.6599
11 Brazil 17 0.8559 0.0950 3.7476 0.9994 0.0010 515.44
12 Mexico 28 0.6894 0.1226 1.5449 0.8812 0.0977 3.9006
13 Mexico 21 0.7195 0.1179 1.8623 0.7972 0.1034 2.8746
14 Mexico 25 0.4673 0.1490 -0.2196 0.4519 0.1418 -0.3396
15 Mexico 28 0.5191 0.1281 0.1488 0.6316 0.1322 0.9955
16 Mexico 16 0.9377 0.0457 9.5771 0.9976 0.0026 190.72
17 Mexico 25 0.6498 0.1773 0.8448 1.0428 0.1071 5.0668
18 Mexico 18 0.5660 0.1783 0.3699 1.0187 0.0449 11.549
19 Mexico 16 0.4447 0.2054 -0.2691 0.8861 0.1053 3.6673
20 Mexico 26 0.5529 0.1251 0.4228 0.5587 0.1253 0.4687
21 Mexico 21 0.7409 0.1084 2.2213 0.7324 0.1083 2.1467
22 Mexico 31 0.6364 0.1247 1.0941 0.7726 0.1125 2.4221
23 Mexico 31 0.6297 0.1596 0.8127 0.6703 0.1542 1.1046
24 Mexico 24 0.3920 0.1361 -0.7931 0.3767 0.1301 -0.9481
Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis that ^  = 0:5. The instruments used are the following: a
constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2).
20Table 5: Asymmetry parameter, three-months-ahead forecasts, quad-quad loss function
No. Country Obs. ^ Model1 se z-test ^ Model2 se z-test
1 Brazil 23 0.4528 0.1480 -0.3190 0.6942 0.1338 1.4519
2 Brazil 21 0.4055 0.1518 -0.6228 0.5742 0.1540 0.4819
3 Brazil 22 0.2132 0.0954 -3.0052 0.1784 0.0825 -3.8992
4 Brazil 25 0.6038 0.1512 0.6869 0.6050 0.1484 0.7074
5 Brazil 20 0.5449 0.1779 0.2522 0.9184 0.0933 4.4864
6 Brazil 19 0.6264 0.1511 0.8360 0.8710 0.0852 4.3546
7 Brazil 23 0.3824 0.1326 -0.8865 0.3894 0.1333 -0.8293
8 Brazil 28 0.5196 0.1378 0.1418 0.6306 0.1283 1.0175
9 Brazil 27 0.6967 0.1236 1.5907 0.8709 0.0791 4.6920
10 Brazil 24 0.3422 0.1344 -1.1740 0.3365 0.1283 -1.2741
11 Brazil 17 0.8185 0.1023 3.1141 0.9558 0.0483 9.4343
12 Mexico 28 0.6479 0.1454 1.0170 0.9566 0.1172 3.8976
13 Mexico 28 0.5751 0.1644 0.4568 0.5664 0.1626 0.4082
14 Mexico 25 0.4455 0.1547 -0.3521 0.4972 0.1542 -0.0181
15 Mexico 28 0.5069 0.1341 0.0512 0.5023 0.1335 0.0173
16 Mexico 16 0.4806 0.2175 -0.0890 0.7971 0.1521 1.9531
17 Mexico 25 0.5932 0.1638 0.5689 0.5852 0.1623 0.5249
18 Mexico 18 0.5386 0.1656 0.2329 0.5380 0.1656 0.2297
19 Mexico 16 0.3799 0.1890 -0.6356 0.3150 0.1687 -1.0967
20 Mexico 26 0.6102 0.1422 0.7749 0.6303 0.1421 0.9169
21 Mexico 21 0.7221 0.1091 2.0352 0.7300 0.1081 2.1280
22 Mexico 31 0.6200 0.1305 0.9201 0.6497 0.1317 1.1364
23 Mexico 31 0.6041 0.1493 0.6974 0.7470 0.1482 1.6667
24 Mexico 25 0.4616 0.1391 -0.2758 0.4822 0.1406 -0.1264
Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis that ^  = 0:5. The instruments used are the following: a
constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2).
21Table 6: J-test, one-month-ahead forecasts, lin-lin loss function
No. Country Obs. J(0:5) p J(^ ) p
1 Brazil 23 2.1818 0.3359 0.0914 0.7624
2 Brazil 18 0.8793 0.6443 0.8793 0.3484
3 Brazil 22 0.0118 0.9941 0.0118 0.9134
4 Brazil 25 0.3601 0.8352 0.0001 0.9906
5 Brazil 20 7.8812 0.0194 1.1856 0.2762
6 Brazil 19 5.1014 0.0780 6.3602 0.0117
7 Brazil 22 5.2799 0.0714 4.5520 0.0329
8 Brazil 28 3.5814 0.1668 3.0209 0.0822
9 Brazil 27 4.4905 0.1059 0.0145 0.9043
10 Brazil 22 3.0169 0.2213 2.1963 0.1383
11 Brazil 17 7.2308 0.0269 2.2578 0.1329
12 Mexico 28 11.5652 0.0031 8.1592 0.0043
13 Mexico 21 5.9841 0.0502 0.5554 0.4561
14 Mexico 25 5.1486 0.0762 0.3236 0.5695
15 Mexico 28 5.6278 0.0600 5.2072 0.0225
16 Mexico 16 6.8544 0.0325 4.7421 0.0294
17 Mexico 25 4.9718 0.0832 0.2067 0.6494
18 Mexico 18 5.4201 0.0665 12.890 0.0003
19 Mexico 16 2.6471 0.2662 1.0717 0.3006
20 Mexico 26 2.2265 0.3285 1.1699 0.2794
21 Mexico 21 2.5941 0.2733 0.2683 0.6045
22 Mexico 31 5.7430 0.0566 2.8806 0.0897
23 Mexico 31 4.1503 0.1255 0.2251 0.6352
24 Mexico 24 3.3397 0.1883 0.9109 0.3399
Note: p = p-value. J(0:5) denotes the J-test for a symmetric loss function. J(^ ) denotes the J-test for an estimated
(unconstrained) loss function. The instruments used are a constant and the lagged exchange rates.
22Table 7: J-test, three-months-ahead forecasts, lin-lin loss function
No. Country Obs. J(0:5) p J(^ ) p
1 Brazil 23 2.3680 0.3061 0.3795 0.5379
2 Brazil 21 3.5788 0.1671 3.3140 0.0687
3 Brazil 22 0.7552 0.6855 0.6230 0.4299
4 Brazil 25 1.9733 0.3728 0.0163 0.8983
5 Brazil 20 6.7423 0.0343 2.0458 0.1526
6 Brazil 19 6.6327 0.0363 7.6875 0.0056
7 Brazil 23 9.1572 0.0103 7.4500 0.0063
8 Brazil 28 5.4952 0.0641 0.4821 0.4875
9 Brazil 27 9.4242 0.0090 4.4906 0.0341
10 Brazil 24 0.6683 0.7159 0.5062 0.4768
11 Brazil 17 4.7651 0.0923 0.0015 0.9696
12 Mexico 28 4.3854 0.1116 1.5183 0.2179
13 Mexico 28 3.0701 0.2154 0.8566 0.3547
14 Mexico 25 1.3029 0.5213 0.3074 0.5793
15 Mexico 28 0.6066 0.7384 0.0405 0.8405
16 Mexico 16 2.8966 0.2350 2.2497 0.1336
17 Mexico 25 0.7166 0.6989 0.4002 0.5270
18 Mexico 18 1.0117 0.6030 1.0117 0.3145
19 Mexico 16 1.7226 0.4226 0.5722 0.4494
20 Mexico 26 5.5487 0.0624 0.0244 0.8759
21 Mexico 21 1.9157 0.3837 0.7078 0.4002
22 Mexico 31 6.8860 0.0320 2.2835 0.1308
23 Mexico 31 5.5363 0.0628 2.3976 0.1215
24 Mexico 25 0.0427 0.9789 0.0027 0.9582
Note: p = p-value. J(0:5) denotes the J-test for a symmetric loss function. J(^ ) denotes the J-test for an estimated
(unconstrained) loss function. The instruments used are a constant and the lagged exchange rates.
23Table 8: J-test, one-month-ahead forecasts, quad-quad loss function
No. Country Obs. J(0:5) p J(^ ) p
1 Brazil 23 4.0416 0.1326 6.0986 0.0135
2 Brazil 18 4.0914 0.1293 4.3623 0.0367
3 Brazil 22 3.7125 0.1563 0.0274 0.8684
4 Brazil 25 0.2215 0.8952 0.0984 0.7538
5 Brazil 20 4.8138 0.0901 132.67 0.0000
6 Brazil 19 5.3331 0.0695 10.383 0.0013
7 Brazil 22 1.1471 0.5635 0.2778 0.5981
8 Brazil 28 4.0350 0.1330 7.1601 0.0075
9 Brazil 27 4.9235 0.0853 16.764 0.0000
10 Brazil 22 2.8607 0.2392 5.4022 0.0201
11 Brazil 17 3.4945 0.1743 21936 0.0000
12 Mexico 28 5.4043 0.0671 7.8421 0.0051
13 Mexico 21 3.8903 0.1430 2.0860 0.1487
14 Mexico 25 0.2595 0.8783 0.1846 0.6674
15 Mexico 28 4.7074 0.0950 6.0203 0.0141
16 Mexico 16 9.2949 0.0096 529.13 0.0000
17 Mexico 25 1.5025 0.4718 16.200 0.0001
18 Mexico 18 2.2757 0.3205 104.41 0.0000
19 Mexico 16 1.5566 0.4592 19.295 0.0000
20 Mexico 26 1.1949 0.5502 1.0867 0.2972
21 Mexico 21 2.5945 0.2733 0.3146 0.5749
22 Mexico 31 3.0666 0.2158 5.6655 0.0173
23 Mexico 31 1.4772 0.4778 0.5084 0.4758
24 Mexico 24 0.8741 0.6459 0.2957 0.5866
Note: p = p-value. J(0:5) denotes the J-test for a symmetric loss function. J(^ ) denotes the J-test for an estimated
(unconstrained) loss function. The instruments used are a constant and the lagged exchange rates.
24Table 9: J-test, three-months-ahead forecasts, quad-quad loss function
No. Country Obs. J(0:5) p J(^ ) p
1 Brazil 23 4.5194 0.1044 6.5555 0.0105
2 Brazil 21 4.0647 0.1310 4.9429 0.0262
3 Brazil 22 3.2124 0.2007 1.2651 0.2607
4 Brazil 25 0.5494 0.7598 0.0015 0.9693
5 Brazil 20 6.3811 0.0411 18.274 0.0000
6 Brazil 19 5.2803 0.0714 10.486 0.0012
7 Brazil 23 1.0765 0.5838 0.8012 0.3707
8 Brazil 28 2.4927 0.2876 2.5917 0.1074
9 Brazil 27 6.8084 0.0332 7.2545 0.0071
10 Brazil 24 1.1956 0.5500 0.0254 0.8733
11 Brazil 17 3.2191 0.2000 10.942 0.0009
12 Mexico 28 2.5455 0.2801 11.043 0.0009
13 Mexico 28 1.1116 0.5736 1.1068 0.2928
14 Mexico 25 0.7895 0.6739 0.9019 0.3423
15 Mexico 28 0.7151 0.6994 0.7211 0.3958
16 Mexico 16 1.5833 0.4531 5.7199 0.0168
17 Mexico 25 0.4364 0.8040 0.2575 0.6118
18 Mexico 18 1.1578 0.5605 1.2660 0.2605
19 Mexico 16 1.5565 0.4592 1.1070 0.2927
20 Mexico 26 1.2630 0.5318 1.0050 0.3161
21 Mexico 21 3.2982 0.1922 0.3916 0.5315
22 Mexico 31 2.9339 0.2306 3.0012 0.0832
23 Mexico 31 3.2636 0.1956 3.4016 0.0651
24 Mexico 25 1.0174 0.6013 1.0405 0.3077
Note: p = p-value. J(0:5) denotes the J-test for a symmetric loss function. J(^ ) denotes the J-test for an estimated
(unconstrained) loss function. The instruments used are a constant and the lagged exchange rates.
25Table 10: Quantile test of forecast optimality, one-month-ahead forecasts
No. Country Obs. 1 p-value
1 Brazil 23 -1.3671 0.1860
2 Brazil 18 -2.2201 0.0412
3 Brazil 22 -1.3745 0.1845
4 Brazil 25 -2.4861 0.0206
5 Brazil 20 -3.2887 0.0041
6 Brazil 19 -3.4277 0.0032
7 Brazil 22 -3.9226 0.0008
8 Brazil 28 -3.3369 0.0026
9 Brazil 27 -2.1459 0.0418
10 Brazil 22 -2.2324 0.0372
11 Brazil 17 -0.8070 0.4323
12 Mexico 28 -0.5137 0.6118
13 Mexico 21 -0.0805 0.9367
14 Mexico 25 -2.5788 0.0168
15 Mexico 28 -1.3623 0.1848
16 Mexico 16 1.5047 0.1546
17 Mexico 25 -2.8091 0.0100
18 Mexico 18 -1.1411 0.2706
19 Mexico 16 -4.7531 0.0003
20 Mexico 26 -3.5144 0.0018
21 Mexico 21 -1.8992 0.0728
22 Mexico 31 -2.4773 0.0193
23 Mexico 31 -0.7365 0.4673
24 Mexico 24 -2.3534 0.0279
Note: OLS = ordinary least squares. The table summarizes coeﬃcient estimates for the model It+1 = 0+1(st ft+1)+t+1,
where It+1 = 1 if st+1   ft+1 < 0, and It+1 = 0 otherwise.
26Table 11: Quantile test of forecast optimality, three-months-ahead forecasts
No. Country Obs. 1 p-value
1 Brazil 23 -0.8602 0.3994
2 Brazil 21 -1.1723 0.2556
3 Brazil 22 -1.4357 0.1665
4 Brazil 25 -1.6412 0.1144
5 Brazil 20 -2.5623 0.0196
6 Brazil 19 -3.0546 0.0072
7 Brazil 23 -3.8517 0.0009
8 Brazil 28 -1.9357 0.0639
9 Brazil 27 -2.1695 0.0398
10 Brazil 24 -1.7497 0.0941
11 Brazil 17 -0.6999 0.4947
12 Mexico 28 0.1056 0.9167
13 Mexico 28 -0.7410 0.4654
14 Mexico 25 -2.7082 0.0125
15 Mexico 28 -1.8989 0.0687
16 Mexico 16 0.8227 0.4245
17 Mexico 25 -3.2032 0.0039
18 Mexico 18 -0.6232 0.5419
19 Mexico 16 -1.6987 0.1115
20 Mexico 26 -1.6675 0.1084
21 Mexico 21 -2.7048 0.0140
22 Mexico 31 -2.1931 0.0365
23 Mexico 31 -2.9123 0.0068
24 Mexico 25 -2.6099 0.0157
Note: OLS = ordinary least squares. The table summarizes coeﬃcient estimates for the model It+1 = 0+1(st ft+1)+t+1,
where It+1 = 1 if st+1   ft+1 < 0, and It+1 = 0 otherwise.
27